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Analysis: The London-based Arabic daily newspaper Al-Hayat has published an 
extensive interview with Muhammad Dahlan, a member of the Palestinian Legislative 
Council (PLC) and of the Revolutionary Council of the Fatah Movement and formerly head 
of the Palestinian Preventative Security Force in the Gaza Strip and Arafat’s protégée. 
The interview comprised four segments published between 30 August and 2 September 
2008 on the newspaper’s website.1 In the first segment, Dahlan claims that ‘… there is no 
difference between Hamas, interested in establishing an Islamic Emirate in Gaza, and Al-
Qaeda’.2 According to Dahlan, there is no certainty whether the decision to take over 
Gaza was arrived at by Hamas alone or with the aid of outside actors, but the result, 
according to him, is clear: Hamas intends to establish an Islamic Emirate in the Gaza 
Strip. 
 
Dahlan goes on to say that Hamas is actively working to implement such a plan, which is 
more than just a general aim or aspiration: ‘This isn’t just a plan, it is already being 
implemented. They [Hamas] are firing judges and teachers and appointing in their stead 
others, on their behalf. They are taking over non-governmental establishments even if 
they are not connected to Fatah. [Hamas] said they have problems with Dahlan and his 
people, and later on attacked members of the Executive Force and members of the 
Central Committee and have arrested Dr Zachariah Al-Agha. Later on they attacked all 
Fatah members who actually identified with Hamas, banished them from their houses and 
destroyed them... They attacked [members] of Islamic Jihad and confiscated their 
weapons, closed down the Popular Front’s broadcasting station…’.3 
 
Dahlan has noted al-Qaeda’s influence in the Gaza Strip and claimed that the conditions 
and the environment there are conducive to its enhancement. He claims the Gaza Strip is 
in a state of chaos and brimming with weaponry. The appearance of Hamas has led to a 
loss of vision and strategy in Gaza among all other forces active there, producing an 
environment that is suitable for al-Qaeda. Dahlan concludes: ‘as far as I am concerned, 
there is no difference between Hamas and al-Qaeda. They are all the same’.4 
 
In his eyes, Hamas will not prevent al-Qaeda’s entry to the Gaza Strip, as claimed by 
Hamas’s leader in Damascus Haled Masha’al. Dahlan says that Hamas, as a radical 
Islamic Palestinian organisation, cannot be a source of national Palestinian pride since 
under its rule in Gaza it has murdered 600 people a year, injured around 2,500, crippled 
800 to 900 and made thousands of arrests. Dahlan says this Islamic model ‘has no 
connection with Islam in its tolerant’ aspect.5 
 
Based on Dahlan’s statements and an analysis of Hamas’s activities since its inception in 
1987, it is evident that the organisation’s strategic objective is to take over and replace the 
PLO as the leader of the Palestinian National Movement. To further that end, Hamas aims 
to take over the PLO and its institutions, including the Palestinian Authority’s 
governmental, security and civil apparatus established in 1994 as a result of the 
implementation of the Oslo Accords signed between Israel and the PLO. The latter was 
recognised by Israel for the first time, under the patronage of the international community, 
as the ‘sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people’. Following the success of 
                                                 
1 http://www.daralhayat.com/special/dialogues/. 
2 Ibid. 
3 http://www.daralhayat.com/special/dialogues/08-2008/Item-20080829-0f7cf21e-c0a8-10ed-01bf-
ee336cd96a38/story.html. 
4 http://www.daralhayat.com/special/dialogues/. 
5 Ibid. 
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Hamas’s military take-over of the Palestinian Authority’s security organisation in Gaza in 
the summer of 2007, its full take-over of the Gaza Strip was completed in the summer of 
2008 with two additional moves against the civil system. It took control of the education 
and health systems, establishing a new reality on the ground, to the surprise of the rest of 
the world. 
 
Hamas’s ‘Islamic Emirate 
On 20 June 2007, about a week after Hamas completed its take-over of the Gaza Strip, 
the Palestinian Authority’s President, Abu Mazen, delivered an emotional and angry 
speech to the PLO’s Central Committee in Ramallah. Abu Mazen emphasised that 
establishing an ‘Islamic Emirate’ under the control of Hamas in the Gaza Strip had no 
legitimacy and no roots in Islam. According to him, ‘it is a struggle between the 
[Palestinian] national project and the project of the militias, between the Homeland project 
and the ‘Emirate’ project or the fake country…’. Abu Mazen said that ‘there is no dialogue 
with these murderous conspirators... and there is no choice but to end the revolution on all 
its aspects and phenomena…’6 
 
In this context, it is relevant to cite Abu Mazen’s speech of January 2007 regarding the 
legality of Palestinian representation, in which he claimed that after Hamas won the 
elections to the Legislative Council all organisations refused to participate in its 
government ‘as Hamas has refused to recognise the PLO who is the political backup and 
the source of the Palestinian Authority rule’. According to Abu Mazen, when he advised 
Hamas to honour prior commitments and agreements, it refused to do so.7 Around eight 
months after Hamas took over the Gaza Strip in a successful, short and violent military 
coup, in an interview to the daily paper Al-Hayat on 27 February 2008, Abu Mazen 
warned that elements of al-Qaeda were in Gaza operating with Hamas’s knowledge.8 
 
With Hamas’s take-over of the Gaza Strip, a radical Islamic entity was established that 
used terrorism to achieve its goals and had close connections with the ‘Muslim 
Brotherhood’ in Egypt (whose Palestinian branch is Hamas) and with Iran, the radical 
Islamic Shiite state. During its take-over, Hamas proclaimed its support for Islamic rule 
and its faith in victory over the infidels. It found itself immediately in violent conflict with 
Abu Mazen, the Chairman of the ‘Palestinian Authority’ that represents the national-
secular Fatah movement. Abu Mazen and official Palestinian and Egyptian media began 
using terms such as ‘Islamic Emirate’ when describing the new entity established in the 
Gaza Strip. 
 
The term ‘Islamic Emirate’ has a distinct negative connotation in the modern history of 
Islam. The term refers to a small territory ruled by an Emir (leader) of a fanatic Islamic cult 
that attempts to impose a radical form of Islam. Most Islamic organisations and groups 
that were active (and still are) in Egypt and other Muslim/Arabic countries wanted to 
establish emirates ruled by Islamic law. Examples are the al-Qaeda organisation that 
promotes the establishment of an Islamic emirate in Iraq, the Fatah Al-Islam organisation 
in Lebanon, the Islamic militias of the Shari courts in Somalia and Jihad groups in Egypt. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Al-Jazeera, 20/VI/2007. 
7 Al-Hiyat Al-Jedida, 9/I/2007. 
8 http://www.daralhayat.com/arab_news/levant_news/02-2008/Item-20080226-5773fc52-c0a8-10ed-017c-
4324294e94c0/story.html. 
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At the end of August 2008 the crisis between Fatah and Hamas had reached the 
Palestinian Authority’s schools on the Gaza Strip. With the opening of the school year at 
the beginning of September 2008, the Hamas government removed by force many of the 
teachers and principals who belonged to Fatah. In response, Fatah’s teachers’ union went 
on strike and refused to teach at the schools. Hamas, apparently prepared for this 
scenario, appointed 2,000 new teachers who were politically inclined towards Hamas and 
who had just graduated a few months before. The teachers supporting Fatah were afraid 
to break the strike and return to their posts due to threats from the union in Ramallah that 
they would not receive their salary if they did so. At the same time, the Hamas police 
raided the offices of the Palestinian Teachers’ Union –identified with Fatah– in the Gaza 
Strip and took them over. In addition, the police arrested dozens of teachers sympathetic 
to Fatah for questioning and released them after several hours n detention. 
 
Before that, on 24 August 2008, around half the teachers in Gaza announced a strike due 
to discrimination in their employment by the Palestinian Ministry of Education in Gaza, 
controlled by Hamas. They claimed that teachers supporting Fatah were transferred from 
the schools they were teaching and substituted by teachers who supported Hamas in 
order to reduce the organisation’s influence in Gaza. The Deputy Minister of Education, 
Muhammad Shkair rejected their claims and said that the teachers were transferred for 
‘technical and managerial’ reasons.9 
 
Hamas’s take-over of the educational system in the Gaza Strip proves the importance it 
has for its process of ‘Islamisation’ and in allocating resources and personnel to mould the 
new Palestinian society in Gaza. The educational system employs thousands of people 
and requires substantial current funding for the payment of salaries and the maintenance 
of educational structures.10 
 
According to Dahlan, Hamas is a hostage of Iran and this is something that its activists do 
not conceal, claiming that the Palestinian Authority and Fatah are allies of the US and that 
such an alliance is prejudicial to Palestine. Hamas and Iran, with the aid of Syria, have an 
interest in establishing a countering force. Iran –and Syria to a lesser degree– participates 
in Hamas’s decision-making process in Gaza and has a presence in its headquarters in 
Damascus, but not on the West Bank. Iran is motivated by its own interests and is 
therefore involved in expanding its influence in Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine through 
financial support, weapons, explosives, operational knowledge and training. 
 
Processes of Islamisation and Radicalisation in the Gaza Strip 
Hamas has never deviated from the ideas expressed in its covenant: it strongly rejects the 
Jewish right to self-determination and calls for the establishment of a Palestinian-Islamic 
state on the entire land of ‘Palestine’. After Israel’s disengagement from the Gaza Strip (in 
August 2005) a new reality emerged, which accelerated the establishment of Hamas’s 
distinct area of control in the Gaza Strip. Hamas was clever enough to use its growing 
power to strengthen its position in the Palestinian political arena. In the elections for the 
Legislative Council (in January 2006) it took a majority of votes and formed a government 
in March 2006. Later, in June 2006, it took over the Gaza Strip by force, neutralising 
Fatah’s military and political power and the Palestinian security mechanisms and 
established a radical Islamic entity. This entity is supported by Iran and Syria, has its own 
                                                 
9 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasite/pages/ShArtPE.jhtml?itemNo=1016741&contrassID=2&subContrassID=21&sb
SubContrassID=0. 
10 http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3586971,00.html. 
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internal and foreign policies, runs a campaign of terrorism against Israel and is separate 
from the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, led by Abu Mazen and Fatah. 
 
Hamas’s take-over of the Gaza Strip in mid June 2007 has led to the creation of a radical 
Islamic political entity, with the makings of a sovereign country. This entity is controlled by 
Hamas, a movement with a radical Islamic ideology that it aims to impose on the general 
Palestinian population over and above the standard Islamic social codes in daily life 
through its control of the social, educational and religious system. The population is being 
forced to adopt a stricter religious Islamic line as a public expression of its total loyalty to 
the Hamas government, and this has given rise to a growing divergence between the 
Gaza Strip ruled by Hamas and the West Bank ruled by the national-secular Abu Mazen 
and Fatah. 
 
The ‘Jaljalat’ Groups in Gaza Global Jihad Phenomenon 
Hamas’s rule in Gaza has seen the appearance of organisations linked to the global Jihad 
that have started to carry out attacks against western interests in the Gaza Strip. 
 
Since 2005 a new radical Islamic stream has emerged, largely made up of Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad operatives who are disillusioned with what they consider Hamas’s overly 
‘pragmatic’ attitude that has made it deviate from and betray the Jihad. This radical entity, 
bearing the Arabic Islamic name Jaljalat(‘rolling thunder’, ‘peal’),11 favours al-Qaeda and 
the global Jihad and operates in the Gaza Strip with no interference from the Hamas 
government. Its aim is to maintain the ‘flame’ of Jihad against Israel and to ‘purify’ 
Palestinian society from the West’s presence and influence. The radical Islamic 
organisations linked to the Jaljalat have names drawn from Islamic narratives and myths 
which leave no doubt as to their nature: ‘The Army of the believers-Al Qaeda in Palestine’, 
‘The Army of Islam’, ‘The Mujahideen Battalions’, The Army of the Ummah-Jerusalem’ 
‘Fatah al-Islam in the Land of Ribat’, ‘Abu Rish Brigades – Sword of Islam’, ‘The 
Jerusalem Jihad Warriors movement’ and others that are less well known. 
 
The radical global Jihad-oriented groups in Gaza have adopted the idioms and motifs 
used by other similar Jihadi groups identified or affiliated with al-Qaeda (eh, the ‘thunder’ 
and ‘lightning’ motif is based on the Qur'an):12 
 
‘He (God) it is who shows you the lightning for fear and hope (of rain); and He brings up 
heavy clouds, and the thunder celebrates His praise; and the angels, too, fear him, and 
He sends the thunder-clap and. overtakes there-with whom He will; yet they wrangle 
about God! But He is strong in might’. 
 
Its use in the Jihadi context reflects elements of divine power, violent revenge and the 
overwhelming superiority of Jihad in the name of Allah. Images of lighting, tornadoes and 
hurricanes suggest God’s power, wrath and justice. Certain Jihadi groups may associate 
themselves with these symbols as a means of exaggerating their power and imply that 
they are acting on God’s will. Thus, by using these symbols, Jihadi groups are able to 
represent themselves and their cause as extensions of divine power. Jihadi groups often 
use these motifs in reference to suicide bombers as an expression of their supreme 
motivation and power to execute the will of Allah. 
                                                 
11 ‘The Islamic peal will make the western world tremble’. See 
http://www.ummah.com/forum/showthread.php?t=107206 and 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0EiXr2Rou3A&feature=related. 
12 Surah xiii, 13, 14. 
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On 15 February 2008 an armed gang broke into the YMCA library in Gaza and blew it up. 
As a result the building was destroyed and thousands of books inside were burned. This 
was another attack on Christian western institutions and figures, carried out by one of the 
organisations of the global Jihad (probably the Army of Islam) flourishing in the Gaza Strip 
and that Hamas makes no attempt to control. Sources in the Gaza Strip reported that the 
explosion in the YMCA building was the responsibility of Mumtaz Dughmush, head of the 
Army of Islam, that decided to attack Christians in the Gaza Strip and thereby cause 
embarrassment to Hamas. The latter’s security forces detained a number Army of Islam 
activists but they were released after a short while, following a threat by the Army of Islam 
that it would release its activists by force. 
 
The ‘Army of the Ummah-Jerusalem’, established in the Gaza Strip in 2006, also 
considers all Muslims part of the Islamic nation, defines itself as a pure Islamic 
organisation and therefore rejects Palestinian nationalism. This group is yet another 
global jihad offshoot in the Gaza Strip.13 Since the Hamas take-over there has been an 
increase in the propaganda and terrorist activities carried out by radical Islamic groups 
associated with al-Qaeda and the global jihad. In this they differ from Hamas and the 
Islamic Jihad in Palestine, who have a Palestinian-Islamic approach that also embrace 
Palestinian national objectives. 
 
‘Fatah Al-Islam on the land of Ribat’ claimed responsibility for shooting at the Yad 
Mordechai Kibbutz. It is a terrorist organization operating in Lebanon as a branch of the 
global Jihad. Its centre of power was the Nahar El-Bared Palestinian refugee camp in 
northern Lebanon, from which it was expelled by the Lebanese army in September 2007. 
It has recently begun to claim responsibility for terrorist mortar and rocket attacks from the 
Gaza Strip. 
 
Israeli targets are not the only ones for organisations identifying with the global Jihad in 
the Gaza Strip, since they also attack Western interests. For some time, organisations 
identified with the global Jihad have been attacking Internet cafes throughout the strip. In 
addition, during President Bush’s visit to Israel and the Palestinian Authority (9-11 
January 2008) an organisation calling itself The Army of the Believers – The al-Qaeda 
Organisation in Palestine claimed responsibility for two attacks on the International 
American school in Gaza.14 
 
The Army of Islam (Jaish Al Islam) 
Hamas’s rule in Gaza has been accompanied at all times by an unprecedented growth in 
its military power and the building up of an array of offensive and defensive weaponry. 
 
In addition, there are several other terrorist organisations with a total of around 3,000 to 
4,000 activists, whose cooperation is considered highly valuable by Hamas. Especially 
prominent is the operational cooperation between Hamas and the Popular Resistance 
Committees and the Army of Islam. 
 
According to Dahlan, the Army of Islam, led by Mumtaz Dughmush, is ideologically close 
to al-Qaeda but is not part of Hamas. However, he says that has used the ‘Army of Islam’ 
as its tool, employing it to carry out assassination and missions against the Palestinian 
                                                 
13 Al-Ayyam, 12/I/2008. 
14 ‘Testimony of Steven Emerson Before the United States House of Representatives Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence’, 9/IV/2008, p. 17, http://intelligence.house.gov/Media/PDFS/Emerson040908.pdf. 
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Authority and its leadership in the Gaza Strip. The ‘Army of Islam’ is also involved in 
criminal activities and operates openly and publicly in cooperation with the Hamas regime 
in Gaza. Dahlan recounts that Dughmush led the Palestinian Preventative Security Force 
before the outbreak of the second Intifada, that gave birth to many factions, groups and 
interests and brought Hezbollah, Iran and Islamist organisations to Gaza. 
 
The Army of Islam attracted public attention on 8 May 2007, about two weeks after the 
abduction of the British journalist Alan Johnston, when it published a tape announcing its 
responsibility for the abduction and presenting its demands. The Army of Islam’s 
announcement included radical Islamic terminology as used by al-Qaeda and global Jihad 
entities identified as al-Qaeda supporters. 
 
The Army of Islam has several dozen activists and its leader Dughmush belongs to a 
powerful clan in the Gaza Strip. A year ago he withdrew along with his group of 
supporters from the Popular Resistance Committees. In the past the Army of Islam had 
close connections with Hamas, at least in its early stages. Its activities are similar to those 
of other global Jihad organisations, abducting foreigners and attacking places of 
recreation in the Gaza Strip (such as Internet cafes) that it considers prejudicial to Islamic 
morality. It was one of the three organisations, along with Hamas and the Popular 
Resistance Committees, to announce their responsibility for the abduction of the Israeli 
soldier Gilad Shalit (on 25 June 2006) and was also behind the abduction of two reporters 
from the US Fox News network. 
 
As a local Palestinian organisation in the Gaza Strip with a radical Islamic orientation and 
ideology, the Army of Islam promotes global Jihad objectives that are not primarily 
Palestinian and whose scope extends beyond the Israel-Palestinian conflict, which is 
essentially national, ideological, secular and territorial. The rise of Hamas and other 
radical Islamic forces is giving the conflict a more marked fundamental Islamic religious 
cast, in large part thanks to the increased power and presence of Hamas in the 
Palestinian arena. 
 
Is Hamas a-Qaeda? 
Muhammad Dahlan is well aware of the fact that the achievements of the national 
Palestinian project are under direct threat of being expropriated by Hamas. The latter is 
striving to impose its Arab-Muslim ideology based on the Islamic Ummah (the borderless 
nation of Islam). According to Hamas, the liberation of Palestine is only one step on the 
road towards establishing a global Islamic Caliphate. This is the underlying cause of the 
struggle led by Hamas to undermine Fatah/PLO and which Dahlan considers a threat 
comparable to that posed by al-Qaeda, that also aims to overthrow moderate 
governments in Arab and Muslim countries. 
 
Although Hamas is not al-Qaeda, it would be fair to consider it a local Palestinian 
movement that identifies itself with the radical Islamic concept of establishing an Islamic 
entity in Palestine in a first stage, to subsequently merge with other Islamic entities across 
the world. 
 
Its ideological roots, political agenda and principles show a historical affinity with the 
Muslim Brotherhood movement as a worldwide organisation. This ideology aims to 
impose political and socio-cultural principles that are the same as those promoted by al-
Qaeda. Hamas holds in high consideration the charismatic political Islamic scholar and 
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philosopher Dr Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian from the village of Silat Al-Hartia on the 
West Bank (near Jenin), who also happened to be Osama Bin Laden’s ‘spiritual mentor’.15 
 
Abdullah Azzam is still revered by supporters of the global Jihad around the world. His 
ideology and concepts greatly influenced Bin Laden and he is still a major source of 
inspiration for Hamas, which heavily emphasises his Palestinian identity. Another figure, 
Sheikh Yassin, was directly involved in the one documented case of operational crossover 
between Hamas and al-Qaeda. Nabil ‘Ukal, a 27-year-old from the Jebaliya refugee camp 
in the Gaza Strip was a Hamas Da’awa activist undergoing religious instruction in 
Pakistan, where he was recruited in February 1998 for military training in al-Qaeda’s 
camps in Afghanistan. In April of that year, upon completion of his al-Qaeda training, ‘Ukal 
visited Yassin in Gaza. The sheikh appointed a go-between and provided ‘Ukal with 
US$5,000 to finance his terrorist cell in Gaza. Later, when ‘Ukal and one of his recruits 
wanted to travel back to Pakistan and Afghanistan for additional training and meetings, 
Yassin provided another US$5,000 and prepared a cover story for the Israeli authorities 
about medical treatment in Jordan. A month before his arrest by Israel in June 2000 ‘Ukal 
played host to Richard Reid, the ‘shoe bomber,’ in his home.16 
 
Although Hamas’s current operational activities focus on Israel and the ‘territories’, as a 
radical Islamic organisation it also expresses ambitions and identifies with the Islamic 
organisations active in other Jihad arenas around the world and with their actions and 
objectives (Afghanistan, Chechnya, Iraq, etc). 
 
Dahlan does not differentiate between al-Qaeda and Hamas. Both define themselves as 
worldwide movements, as detailed in the preface to the Hamas covenant: ‘The Movement 
is but one squadron that should be supported by more and more squadrons from this vast 
Arab and Islamic world, until the enemy is vanquished and Allah's victory is realized’.17 In 
the covenant’s second chapter the universal character of the Muslim Brothers movement 
is emphasised and Hamas is explicitly recognised as part of it: ‘The Islamic Resistance 
Movement is one of the wings of Moslem Brotherhood in Palestine. Muslim Brotherhood 
Movement is a universal organization, which constitutes the largest Islamic movement in 
modern times’18 
 
In this respect there is no important ideological or long-term strategic difference between 
Hamas and al-Qaeda, who both have the same long-term goal, although in the short term, 
and for tactical local operational considerations, they act on different levels and focus on 
different objectives. While al-Qaeda aims to realise its goals through global Jihad around 
the world, Hamas aims to reach its goals through a local Jihad within the territory of the 
Palestinian Authority and in the State of Israel. 
 
At this stage and for various reasons Hamas is not interested in being identified as an 
organisation belonging or acting as part of al-Qaeda, although it does not oppose and 
turns a blind eye to the growing extremism inspired by global Jihad entities and extreme 
radical organisations who adopt al-Qaeda’s ideology and its pattern of action in the new 
                                                 
15 Yoni Fighel, ‘Sheikh Abdullah Azzam: Bin Laden´s Spiritual Mentor’, International Policy Institute for 
Counter-Terrorism (ICT), 27/IX/2001. 
16 Yoni Fighel & Yael Shahar, ‘The Al-Qaida-Hizballah Connection’, ICT, 26/II/2002, 
http://212.150.54.123/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=425. 
17 The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement, 18/VIII/1988, 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/hamas.htm. 
18 Ibid. 
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territories under its rule in the Gaza Strip. Hamas, for practical reasons, has distanced 
itself from the global Jihad and al-Qaeda, stressing its character as a local Palestinian 
organisation whose struggle is justified and needs the recognition of the international 
community. A full operational merger with al-Qaeda would be counterproductive and 
prejudicial to Hamas gaining internal Palestinian political and would jeopardise the 
political and funding support it receives from Muslim and Arab states. This tactical 
adjustment is often compensated by the use of radical Islamic rhetoric and motifs and 
symbols similar to al-Qaeda’s. However, it should be pointed out that Hamas is still a 
radical Islamic movement which has much in common with al-Qaeda and that under its 
direct rule in Gaza a number of global Jihad groups are growing constantly. 
 
In this connection, for a number of months Hamas has exchanged verbal criticism with 
Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Bin Laden’s second-in-command, who has attacked it repeatedly for 
having abandoned the ‘way of Jihad’ and for having ‘sold Palestine’ for the comforts of 
government.19 Speakers on behalf of Hamas have retorted that Al-Zawahiri’s position 
stems from his ignorance regarding conditions in Palestine. They claim he encourages 
operational activists with Hamas to undermine the organisation’s leadership with the aim 
of causing a rift in Hamas to provide al-Qaeda with access to Palestine. Hamas is 
currently reluctant to abandon its position as a local independent Palestinian movement 
and to join al-Qaeda, although it shares its ideology to a large extent. 
 
The roots of the conflict between Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Hamas lie in the latter’s victory 
at the Legislative Council elections on 25 January 2006. This was a political ‘earthquake’ 
not only in the internal Palestinian arena but also in the Middle East in general. For the 
first time in the history of the Middle East a terrorist organisation with radical Islamic Sunni 
characteristics identified ideologically with the global Jihad gained power through 
democratic elections. Hamas’s rise to power forced it to deal unexpectedly with the day-
to-day problems of governing and the responsibilities of maintaining and providing for the 
needs of its people, unlike al-Qaeda which does not have to run a country and has no 
obligations or the responsibility of acting with certain constraints. Hamas was forced to 
adopt a pragmatic approach (without abandoning the long-term radical Islamic ideology 
expressed in its covenant). In its effort to gain international recognition and legitimacy, 
Hamas restrained its terrorist activities, softened its extremist messages for a Western 
audience and agreed to include Fatah in the government in accordance with the ‘Mecca 
Agreement’. This made Ayman Al-Zawahiri extremely angry not only on account of its 
content but also because it was signed in the holiest city of Islam and under the patronage 
of the Saudi regime, Bin Laden’s mortal enemy. 
 
It should be emphasised that despite Hamas’s expressions of temporary pragmatism it 
has not abandoned its ideological principles and continues to view Palestine as a land 
dedicated to Islam, Israel as a state with no right to exist and violence and terrorism as 
strategies through which the whole of Palestine will be ‘liberated’. Following its harsh 
criticism of Hamas, al-Qaeda has tried to ‘stake a claim’ in the Palestinian territories. In 
the Gaza Strip there are now several dozen activists identified ideologically with global 
Jihad and with its activities around the world. These activists are trying to build an 
operational terrorist infrastructure in Gaza under Hamas’s rule, but separately from the 
latter’s terrorist infrastructure. 
 
At this stage there is no sure information that indicates a direct operational connection 
between Hamas and al-Qaeda beyond their ideological connection and the emergence of 
                                                 
19 Aljazeera TV, 11/III/2007. 
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small local organisations linked to the global Jihad ideology and with a similar modus 
operandi to al-Qaeda, mainly against western targets in the Gaza Strip. In that respect, 
since the summer of 2007, the Gaza Strip under Hamas’s rule has become an armed 
radical Islamic stronghold and a haven for terrorists. 
 
Gaza as a Haven for Terrorists 
Since Hamas’s took over power in Gaza in the summer of 2007 there has been a marked 
rise in violent terrorist organisations acting without hindrance in an environment of 
lawlessness in which they have the encouragement or tacit agreement of the authorities. 
Hamas’s interests are served by these organisations as the ‘flag bearers’ of the authentic 
‘struggle’ (Mukawamah). Hamas uses these radical Islamic elements to enhance its own 
status as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in the local arena and in 
the inter-Arab and Islamic arena against Israel. 
 
Conditions in the Gaza Strip provide a comfortable environment conditions for the entry of 
global Jihad operators through the Egyptian border and for their growth. The Gaza Strip 
under the rule of Hamas has become a haven for organisations promoting the use of 
terror and producing propaganda in the name of global Jihad. 
 
Conclusion: Al-Qaeda’s interest in reviving the Jihad in Palestine and making it part of its 
global enterprise is evident in the numerous video and audio messages it has produced, 
especially since 2007. So far, however, al-Qaeda has not claimed to have established a 
presence in Palestine, nor has it acknowledged having direct ties to any of the self-
proclaimed Jihadi groups that are currently active in the region, especially in Gaza. 
Moreover, despite its considerable efforts, al-Qaeda has apparently failed to convince 
Hamas –the ruling force in the Gaza Strip– to abandon its political agenda and to declare 
its loyalty and support for al-Qaeda. 
 
Despite this, the words of Muhammad Dahlan –a member of the younger generation of 
Fatah leaders and a representative of the more pragmatic secular-nationalist faction of 
Palestinian society– reflect a growing concern over the erosion of the PLO’s and Fatah’s 
legitimacy in representing Palestinian interests under the Palestinian Authority established 
as a result of the Oslo Accords signed between Israel and the PLO. 
 
The Editor-in-Chief of the London-based Arabic daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Tariq 
Alhomayed, warned that under Hamas’s rule, Gaza was becoming like Afghanistan, a 
hotbed of poverty, violence and strife between armed factions.20 Al-Homayed said: ‘The 
transformation of the Gaza Strip into another Afghanistan is a future whose first casualty 
will be the Palestinians and their cause. This cause has been shattered by Hamas, whose 
members want to rule as they will, and are waiting for the world to accommodate them’. 
Homayed continued his sombre analysis accusing Hamas of being ‘a very real danger to 
the Palestinian cause. They have already blown the chance of creating a Palestinian state 
by splitting off from the legitimate authority of Abu Mazen… we must take a decisive stand 
against Hamas, for a simple reason, the boat in which they are drilling holes will not only 
drown them, but will drown all of us, and we will all be the victims’.21 
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